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In particular, DOD believes "that the Soviets have already progressed in their SS-9 program to the point where they could now deploy a multiple SS-9 with a capability to destroy more than one Minuteman site per SS-9 missile without further flight testing. . . .

The degree of confidence they might have in such a system is not clear. However, within a few months after a decision to violate a MIRV testing ban, the Soviets could demonstrate the capability of the system in an anti-Minuteman role." (p. 11)

-- State, CIA and ACDA believe that "the Soviets have not yet progressed far enough in their testing, even assuming that the current SS-9 program is directed at MIRV development, to operationally deploy a reliable MIRV system." (p. 13)

In particular, State, CIA and ACDA believe that "use of the SS-9 multiples in an individually targeted mode for hard-target counterforce requires that the accuracy be improved, and that 10-15 additional flight tests would be required to achieve the required confidence and accuracy necessary for a limited kill probability." (pp. 10-11)

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INSTRUCTIONS  
APPLY

Comment. This disagreement is representative of most of the disagreements in the paper: it is not clear the extent to which the positions of the two sides are in fact different. We do not have a sharply defined disagreement. The actual disagreement may be over how many more tests are needed to achieve 80 percent reliability, or over whether the Soviets would (as opposed to could) deploy a low confidence system.

Can the Soviets successfully evade a MIRV test ban?

-- DOD believes that [redacted] systems, existing or programmed, are not capable of adequately verifying a MIRV test ban." (p. 15)

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-- State, CIA and ACDA believe that "a clandestine MIRV development program would involve repeated flight tests which would constantly expose the program to the risks of detection. . . .

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test failures or collection success by multiple sensors would eventually expose the purpose of their tests." (p. 14)

Comment. Though the difference here seems to be somewhat sharper, the precise nature of the disagreement is still not clear. For example, there may be agreement on what kinds of Soviet test activities we can and cannot detect, but disagreement on whether or not our detection capability can furnish proof of MIRV testing sufficient to justify U.S. abrogation. (If we framed the issue in this way, there might not be disagreement.)

Because of these ambiguities, I think it would be helpful to have another meeting of the MIRV panel to discuss the paper and clarify the points of disagreement. If you approve, I will prepare a talking paper which is designed to make precise the extent, nature and basis of disagreement.

Approve meeting of MIRV Panel \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove another meeting, prepare  
summary of paper as is for President \_\_\_\_\_

Other \_\_\_\_\_

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